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F o r e w o r d
For the second time in less than a decade, the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce is conducting 
hearings on the performance of the public accounting profession.
The AICPA appeared before the subcommittee on March 6. Our testimony 
concentrated on
•  The quality improvement programs of the Division for CPA Firms.
•  Actions taken to enhance auditor independence.
•  Steps taken to assist smaller CPA firms.
•  Improvements made in the standards-setting process.
The testimony was accompanied by a paper on the quality of independent audits 
that discussed
•  The distinction between a business failure and an audit failure.
•  The nature of audit failures and their implications for the general level of audit 
quality in the profession.
•  The effectiveness of existing regulation of the profession.
•  The standards-setting process.
•  Independence.
•  The performance of management advisory services for audit clients.
Because of the importance of issues raised by these hearings, we are sending a 
copy of our testimony to each AICPA member.
New York 
March 8 ,  1985
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Statement of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
U.S. House of Representatives,
March 6, 1985
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I am Philip B. Chenok, president 
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA or Institute), the 
national professional organization of certified public accountants (CPAs) in the 
United States. Its service to the profession and to the public spans almost one hun­
dred years. Today, membership consists of over 230,000 CPAs in public practice, 
in industry, in education, and in government. Over the years, the AICPA has been 
a principal force in developing standards, educational programs, and professional 
publications to improve the quality of services provided by CPAs. The Institute is 
widely recognized as the authoritative voice of the accounting profession.
We are here today to help the committee evaluate the effectiveness and indepen­
dence of audits of the financial statements of American business. In the hope that 
our comments might provide useful perspective for this inquiry, the Institute is 
submitting as part of this testimony a paper titled “AICPA Comments on the Qual­
ity of Independent Audits.”
In that paper we discuss the nature of financial statements and the audit function, 
explain the difference between “business failures” and “audit failures,” set out the 
elements of the existing regulatory structure, comment on the process for setting 
accounting and auditing standards, discuss the concept of independence, and iden­
tify certain current projects designed to strengthen audit quality. These are all mat­
ters of considerable importance and some complexity, and I commend that paper to 
your reading.
Rather than summarize our paper, I would like to take the time allotted to me to 
discuss the actions taken by the AICPA in response to concerns raised when Con­
gress last examined the accounting profession. These concerns related to
•  Whether there was a need for a federally legislated organization to regulate 
CPA firms that practice before the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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•  Whether auditors were sufficiently independent of their clients.
•  Whether smaller accounting firms could compete effectively for audits of 
public companies.
•  Whether the process for setting accounting and auditing standards should be 
opened to public scrutiny.
We believe the profession has dealt effectively with these matters in the inter­
vening years.
II. ACTIONS TAKEN TO REGULATE CPA 
FIRMS
The AICPA Division for CPA Firms was created in 1977 to improve the quality 
of accounting and auditing services provided by independent public account­
ing firms. This initiative represents a major commitment to professional self­
regulation.
The division is comprised of two sections: A Private Companies Practice 
Section for firms that provide accounting and auditing services to nonpublic 
entities and an SEC Practice Section for firms whose audit practice includes SEC 
registrants.
Each section has significant membership requirements, the most important of 
which calls for a critical quality assurance review by other CPAs of a member 
firm’s accounting and auditing practice every three years. Reports on these 
reviews are available to the public. In the case of the SEC Practice Section, a firm’s 
required response to its reviewers’ written suggestions for improvement along 
with the suggestions themselves are also available for public inspection.
When significant problems with a firm’s quality control policies or procedures 
are identified, the firm may be required to agree to revisits by the reviewers to 
determine that necessary corrective actions were taken, to submit to accelerated 
peer reviews, or to provide additional education for specified staff. If a specific 
audit engagement is found to have been performed in a substandard manner, firms 
are required to take appropriate corrective action, such as performance of omitted 
auditing procedures, correction of financial statements, or withdrawal of their 
audit report.
All of the activities of the SEC Practice Section of the division are under the 
scrutiny of the Public Oversight Board, consisting of five highly respected, inde­
pendent individuals. The SEC has access to the peer review process through the 
Public Oversight Board, thus providing further assurance that there is appropriate 
recognition of the public interest in the way these activities are carried out.
As a complement to the peer review process, SEC Practice Section member 
firms also accept an affirmative obligation to report to the section’s Special Investi­
gations Committee any litigation alleging audit failure with respect to SEC clients.
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That committee determines whether corrective steps should be taken to provide 
assurance of a firm’s continuing ability to perform audits in conformity with pro­
fessional standards. The committee is also charged with determining whether 
there is a need to reconsider the adequacy of existing professional standards.
The division’s activities are corrective rather than punitive. Some have urged 
the division for CPA Firms to sanction member firms through fines, censures, and 
the like, to be imposed with attendant publicity.
From its very beginning, the division’s emphasis has been on remedial action 
designed to strengthen quality control, to prevent recurrences of problems, and to 
correct any noted deficiencies in the practice of member firms. Formal sanctioning 
powers have been reserved as a means of inducing member firm cooperation in 
bringing about the necessary remedial action. When appropriate, sanctions are 
imposed by others — the SEC, the state boards of accountancy, or the courts. The 
division’s programs are intended to complement those other aspects of the total 
regulatory structure, not to duplicate them.
Division members audit about 86 percent of all publicly held companies, 
accounting for 99 percent of the revenue reported by such companies. While this 
coverage is an outstanding accomplishment considering the voluntary nature of 
the program, division membership is expected to increase further as AICPA mem­
bers and the public become more aware of its significance and of the usefulness of 
peer review reports. In mid-1984 the two sections began a major information pro­
gram to increase public awareness of the division.
We believe the foregoing record of accomplishment adequately responds to the 
concerns expressed by the Congress and that there is no need for a federally legis­
lated organization to regulate CPA firms that practice before the SEC.
///. ACTIONS TAKEN TO ENHANCE AUDITOR 
INDEPENDENCE
Let me now turn to auditor independence, the hallmark of the accounting profes­
sion. Independence assures that CPAs act with integrity and objectivity. Not only 
must the auditor maintain an independent mental attitude with respect to the entity 
being audited, he or she must refrain from financial interests or personal or 
employment relationships that would compromise the audit function. The concept 
of independence must be carefully guarded in a changing environment, and it must 
be emphasized to each succeeding generation of CPAs. I would like to summarize 
some of the actions we have taken in recent years to do this.
•  AICPA has encouraged the formation of audit committees including outside 
directors and has published a booklet to assist companies in that undertaking. 
It is now common practice for auditors to attend annual meetings of public 
companies to respond to shareholder questions.
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•  The membership requirements of the SEC Practice Section include, with 
respect to SEC registrants, periodic rotation of the partners in charge of those 
audits, concurring review by a partner not otherwise involved with the 
engagement, and a report to the audit committee of any disagreement with 
management that, if not satisfactorily resolved, would have caused the issu­
ance of a qualified report on the financial statements.
•  The SEC Practice Section requires member firms to report to audit commit­
tees of SEC registrants the total fees received for management advisory ser­
vices during the years under audit and a description of the types of such 
services rendered. Also, SECPS member firms are required to report, for the 
section’s public files, aggregated information with respect to fees received for 
management advisory services. Finally, special attention is being given in 
peer reviews to the quality of the audit work performed for SEC clients where 
fees from MAS engagements equal or exceed audit fees.
Our paper on audit quality discusses in some detail why the AICPA believes that 
it would be a serious mistake to prohibit the performance of management advisory 
services by independent auditors. CPAs are called upon to provide these services 
because of their objectivity and analytical skills and their knowledge of a client’s 
business. Moreover, no compelling evidence has been found that MAS has 
impaired independence or adversely impacted the quality of audits. Indeed, 
knowledge gained in providing these services often complements information 
obtained in the audit process and enhances audit reliability.
IV. ACTIONS TAKEN TO ASSIST SMALLER 
CPA FIRMS
The third area of concern in the earlier hearings related to the ability of smaller 
accounting firms to compete effectively for audits of public companies. Since 
then, smaller firms believe the situation has worsened as competition within the 
profession has increased substantially, in part because of changes made in the 
advertising and solicitation rules of the Institute’s Code of Professional Ethics, 
which were necessitated by changes in the application of the antitrust laws to pro­
fessional organizations.
During this period, recommendations of a special committee organized to con­
sider the needs of small and medium-sized firms have largely been implemented. 
Moreover, through the division’s peer review process, firms of all sizes can dem­
onstrate that they are able to render accounting and auditing services in conformity 
with professional standards.
Finally, the Technical Issues Committee of the Private Companies Practice Sec­
tion has been active and effective in speaking out on matters, including accounting 
and auditing standards, that affect private companies and the CPAs who serve 
them.
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V. ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPROVE 
PARTICIPATION IN THE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS
Prior congressional concerns also dealt with the need for greater participation in 
the standard-setting process. The Institute has added three non-CPA public repre­
sentatives to its board of directors, and has opened to the public the policy-making 
meetings of the Institute’s governing Council and its senior technical committees, 
such as the Auditing Standards Board. Frequent meetings are held with representa­
tives of user groups and others to keep them informed of projects in process. Press 
releases are issued on important developments, exposure drafts of proposed pro­
nouncements are distributed to interested parties, and public hearings are held on 
controversial subjects.
Efforts have been made to encourage members from smaller firms to serve on 
senior committees, and limitations exist with respect to the participation of those 
from the eight largest firms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, Mr. Chairman, the financial reporting system in the United 
States depends on the integrity of all those involved in the process — management 
that reports on activities and independent auditors who objectively review those 
reports. The AICPA will continue to strive to maintain and improve the quality of 
accounting practice and independent audits. As indicated in our detailed paper, 
some special studies have been begun in important areas to improve audit quality 
and others have been under way for some time. In addition, there is an ongoing 
effort by the AICPA to monitor the effectiveness of auditing standards and to make 
changes when they are called for. Let me list our most recent initiatives:
1. Discussions are being held with representatives of other organizations to 
determine whether a multi-organizational effort might be useful in identify­
ing ways to improve the prevention and detection of fraud.
2. A re-examination of the existing auditing guidance with respect to bank loan 
loss reserves is being undertaken.
3. A special AICPA committee is studying the relevance of the AICPA Code of 
Professional Ethics and the adequacy of the related enforcement machinery 
in today’s environment. The special committee is expected to issue a draft 
report in the fall of 1985.
4. A task force of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA 
Firms has been studying steps the section might take to enhance profession­
alism in the application of accounting standards. Such steps might include 
changes in the section’s membership requirements and certain changes in the 
scope of peer review.
7
5. In accordance with the 1984 recommendations of a special committee that 
studied the structure and operations of the SEC Practice Section, the section 
is presently considering how the public might be made more aware of the 
procedures and findings of its Special Investigations Committee.
Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you and the subcommittee that the members of 
the AICPA are dedicated to strengthening the system of financial reporting. We 
recognize the paramount importance of the public interest in our work and will 
carefully study the record of these hearings in an effort to make further improve­
ments. The accounting profession is committed to standards of excellence and 
integrity, and we believe it is deserving of the confidence of the investing public 
and the Congress.
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AICPA Comments on the 
Quality of Independent Audits
A  Paper Submitted With 
Oral Testimony of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
U.S. House of Representatives,
March 6, 1985
INTRODUCTION
Periodically, members of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
among others, express concern about the quality of audits being performed by 
independent CPAs. Although other factors may be involved, these concerns arise 
when there has been a sudden upswing in the number of publicly traded companies 
that unexpectedly encounter severe financial difficulties or file for protection under 
the bankruptcy statutes. The concerns are heightened when very large companies 
are involved, their shareholders and credit grantors suffer heavy losses, and the 
financial difficulties are widely reported in the national financial press.
A combination of the frequency of such business failures, the large amounts of 
losses incurred, and the sudden plunge in the prestige and reputation of the major 
companies involved may signal that something is going awry that requires atten­
tion. This is particularly true when there is a concentration of failures in a single 
industry. For example, a number of banks and other financial institutions have 
recently failed. In earlier times, similar problems afflicted the real estate invest­
ment trust and franchising industries. When this happens, attention is frequently 
focused on the financial reporting by the failed entities and on independent audi­
tors and the quality of their work.
BUSINESS FAILURES AND THE AUDIT 
FUNCTION
Failures of large business enterprises invariably are accompanied by multi-million 
dollar lawsuits against their independent auditors on behalf of shareholders and 
creditors. Indeed, the suits often focus on the CPA firms because they are usually 
the “deepest pockets” available in the financial rubble of a failed company. 
Asserting their reliance on the audited financial statements, the plaintiffs allege 
that the statements were misleading and that the auditors failed to comply with
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professional standards in examining and reporting on them. The extensive media 
coverage of these events often conveys the impression that an actual audit failure 
has occurred.
To be sure, while the objective of CPAs is to prevent all audit failures, auditors 
are human and performance failures can and do occur. But a business failure or the 
filing of a lawsuit or media notoriety does not necessarily mean that there has been 
an audit failure. Even payments made by CPA firms in settlement of lawsuits are 
not proof of an audit failure. Such payments may be made simply because they are 
less than the potential legal and other costs of defending the firm in litigation.
Businesses fail for a variety of reasons that are unrelated to the financial report­
ing process. Poor management, societal or technological developments, domestic 
and foreign competition, and changes in the economy are some of the major causes 
of business failures.
Investors and creditors are responsible for assessing the risk of investing in or 
lending to a company. Accordingly, in making that judgment, they need to con­
sider a wide range of information in addition to the historical financial information 
included in audited financial statements. The quality of management, develop­
ments in the industry, labor relations, marketing and product development plans, 
and the state of the economy are some of the factors that may be as relevant or even 
more relevant than historical financial statement information. As a result, inves­
tors and creditors can make bad judgments about a company and its future pros­
pects even though the audit of the historical financial statements is without fault.
The role of the independent auditor is not to guarantee that investors and credi­
tors will not make bad judgments and suffer losses. Neither is it to advise users of 
financial statements on the desirability of investing in or lending to a company.
The proper, long-standing role of the independent auditor is to provide the pub­
lic with reasonable assurance that the representations of management reflected in 
the company’s financial statements and the related disclosures comply with gener­
ally accepted accounting principles. The independent audit should bring a trained, 
experienced, professional oversight to the financial reporting process and, thus, 
serves to deter the issuance of misleading financial statements by management.
Indeed, in a January 1985 Pace University survey of Fortune 500 and private 
companies, 107 of the 117 respondents indicated that they would have an annual 
audit by a public accounting firm even if it were not required. The most frequently 
cited reasons were that the independent audit imposes discipline on the entire 
financial system and that an independent audit is required for credibility of finan­
cial statements.
The broad question of whether independent auditors are satisfactorily fulfilling 
their intended role leads to a number of inquiries:
1. Do the current reports of alleged audit failures indicate a deterioration of 
audit quality?
2. Is there sufficient regulation of independent auditors to safeguard against 
negligence or lack of objectivity or integrity?
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3. Would changes in the present system of establishing financial accounting 
and auditing standards reduce the incidence of business and audit failures?
4. Is the performance of management advisory services for audit clients impair­
ing the independence, integrity, or objectivity of auditors?
ALLEGED AUDIT FAILURES AND AUDIT 
QUALITY
Professional standards require the auditor to plan his examination to search for 
misstatements that would have a material effect on the financial statements, but 
they do not call for extended auditing procedures to detect fraud unless the audi­
tor’s examination causes him to believe material fraud may exist. This is because 
the cost of an audit must be reasonable in relation to the expected benefits. How­
ever, auditors can and do detect fraud in the course of audit engagements. An inde­
pendent auditor’s standard report implicitly indicates his belief that the financial 
statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated as a result of error or 
irregularities.
As previously discussed, business failures are not caused by audit failures. 
Business failures may be caused, or hidden, by a material management fraud that 
goes undetected by the independent auditor until severe financial difficulties or 
some other events cause the fraud to be revealed. In these situations, notwithstand­
ing the auditor’s compliance with generally accepted auditing standards, forgery, 
unrecorded transactions or extensive collusion can make some management frauds 
exceedingly difficult if not impossible for auditors to detect.
The detection of management fraud is one of the most difficult problems faced 
by independent auditors, one that has received and continues to receive a great deal 
of attention by the profession.
Professional auditing standards have long included the concept of selective test­
ing. Consistent with that concept, auditors rarely audit all of the transactions that 
compose an individual item (for example, accounts receivables) in the financial 
statements because the cost to do so would be prohibitive. Because of cost consid­
erations, a sampling method is also used by the Internal Revenue Service in audit­
ing tax returns and by the Securities and Exchange Commission in reviewing 
filings by registrants.
Auditors study and evaluate a company’s system of internal control to decide on 
the nature, timing, and extent of tests to be performed. Nevertheless, it is possible 
for any control system to be circumvented, in which case even an audit of all trans­
actions may fail to disclose the fraud. Thus, rather than being indicative of a gen­
eral problem with audit quality in the profession, the failure to detect management 
fraud is more likely to be the result of the sophistication with which the fraud was 
carried out or the result of a human error on the part of the individual auditor. Also, 
to be frank, courts have concluded in rare cases that the conduct of an individual
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auditor was felonious. But in all of these situations, the auditing firm is as much the 
victim of the fraud as are the investors and creditors.
In addition to undetected fraud, there are other circumstances that give rise to 
perceptions of audit failure and concerns about audit quality. For example, a com­
pany, with the auditor’s knowledge and consent, may have selected an acceptable 
accounting treatment that presents its financial condition and operating results in 
the most favorable light. If the business subsequently fails or encounters severe 
financial problems, the auditor’s acceptance of that treatment is questioned in the 
light of hindsight.
Since these situations are not cases of oversight by the auditor, they are not 
“ audit failures” in the sense that errors or irregularities were not detected. But 
some critics of the profession contend that cases involving accounting treatment 
questions are even more serious because they see them as involving faulty judg­
ment or, even worse, a lack of objectivity or integrity on the part of the auditor.
Auditors do insist on accounting changes when the appropriate accounting is 
clear. But what accounting standard is appropriate in a particular circumstance is 
not always clear. Accounting standards require the application of judgment. This 
stems from the fact that most important items in financial statements cannot be 
measured precisely but have to be estimated. For example, the preparer of finan­
cial statements has to estimate the amount of accounts receivable that will not be 
collected because goods may be returned or customers may default, the amount of 
inventory that should be considered obsolete, the useful lives of property and 
equipment, the amounts of possible losses from such things as product warranty 
claims or lawsuits, and whether and how revenue should be recognized as, for 
example, in a construction project extending over several years.
Thus, although financial statements are presented as numbers that may appear to 
be precise, the amounts are and can be only reasonable approximations of the 
results of a company’s transactions. Complete accuracy is rendered impossible by 
the fact that financial statements are issued at regular points in time while certain of 
the underlying transactions are still not complete and important events that will 
have an effect on those statements have not or may not yet have taken place. There­
fore, the fact that an accounting judgment made at the time of the audit may be 
shown by subsequent events to have been overly optimistic or conservative does 
not mean that the auditor’s and management’s judgment or conduct was flawed.
Understandably, auditors sometimes differ in their judgments about the 
accounting treatment that is appropriate when applying accounting standards to 
complex transactions. Concerns arise when companies, especially those in finan­
cial trouble, take advantage of the differences in judgments among CPA firms to 
seek the answer most favorable to them. This practice places added pressure on 
auditors. But few auditors would knowingly risk such severe penalties as legal lia­
bility or loss of reputation for independence and integrity by agreeing to account­
ing treatments that were not consistent with their firmly-held professional 
convictions.
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Another source of concern stems from cases where accounting measurement 
and disclosure standards are fully complied with and no fraud is involved, but a 
company unexpectedly fails. Critics generally insist that auditors should issue an 
explicit warning when a company is in a precarious condition.
As previously indicated, the auditor’s role is to express an opinion on the con­
formity of the financial statements and related disclosures with generally accepted 
accounting principles. Those principles call for disclosure of uncertainties and 
contingencies in appropriate circumstances. Investors and creditors are expected 
to study, among other things, the financial statements and to assess the company’s 
financial condition in the light of their own objectives and their tolerance for risk. 
Of course, auditors do qualify their opinions when questions about the ability of a 
company to continue in existence raise significant doubts about the amounts and 
classification of assets and liabilities. Such a qualification involves complex pro­
fessional judgments and should be given only when circumstances demand.
In summary, a business failure is not the same as an audit failure, and actual 
audit failures need to be carefully distinguished from perceived failures. Perceived 
audit failures often stem from a lack of understanding of what reasonably can be 
expected to be achieved by audits or of the facts in a particular case. Misunder­
standings of the nature, purpose, and limitations of financial statements also con­
tribute to misperceptions that audit failures have occurred.
Actual audit failures are generally the result of honest human error on the part of 
individual auditors rather than a reflection of the general quality of work by their 
firms or the profession. Such errors may involve failing to detect material errors or 
irregularities or making good-faith judgments on accounting matters that are 
proven faulty by subsequent events.
Financial statements are necessarily only a reasonable approximation of a com­
pany’s financial condition and results of operations. For this and other reasons, 
independent audits do not and cannot provide absolute assurance on the accuracy 
of financial statements. However, independent audits do provide a considerable 
measure of assurance that financial statements are not misleading within the con­
text of generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore, it is important to all 
users of financial statements that audits be performed as effectively as possible. 
This is an objective not only of the SEC and of Congress, but is of prime impor­
tance to the AICPA.
REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
A major question in a review of the quality of audits is whether there is sufficient 
regulation of independent auditors. Regulation and disciplinary machinery are 
generally seen as means of preventing — through the threat of sanctions— dishon­
esty or carelessness on the part of independent auditors. While this cannot guaran­
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tee that honest mistakes will not be made, regulation and the prospect of penalty 
are believed to be appropriate countervailing forces to the pressures on objectivity 
and integrity encountered by auditors in the marketplace. This general proposition 
is not disputed, but the nature and extent of regulation required and the point at 
which diminishing effectiveness is reached is the subject of different opinions.
The AICPA believes that the body of regulation presently in place is basically 
sufficient and that auditors are in fact exercising a high degree of objectivity and 
integrity. This is not to assert that problems do not exist or that improvements can­
not be made. Indeed, the public accounting profession constantly strives for 
improvement. The AICPA believes that the present framework for bringing about 
needed improvements is adequate and appropriate to the task and that increased 
regulation would not be likely to yield significant improvements.
In any event, the types of losses from sudden business failures that give rise to 
concerns about the quality of financial statements and audits will continue to occur 
from time to time. Added regulation of auditors is not a solution to the problem of 
business failures because they stem from factors other than the quality of financial 
reporting and auditing. Although financial statements can provide information that 
may foreshadow the possibility of failure, they are but one of several tools that 
should be used by investors and creditors in forming judgments about the financial 
prospects of a company.
The AICPA’s judgment about the adequacy of existing regulation is based upon 
many years of experience with the mosaic of regulation currently in place as 
described below:
1. To become and remain licensed under state law administered by state boards 
of accountancy, independent auditors must —
a. Meet minimum education requirements.
b. Pass a rigorous uniform CPA examination.
c. Have experience in the practice of public accounting to become licensed 
in most jurisdictions.
d. Show evidence of good moral character.
e. Engage in continuing professional education to remain licensed in most 
jurisdictions.
2. CPAs and their firms are required to comply with extensive regulations 
promulgated by private-sector standards-setting bodies as well as by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and by a number of other federal and 
state regulatory bodies. Those standards and principles, together with 
related interpretations and guides, constitute a body of professional literature 
unparalleled anywhere else in the world.
3. CPAs and their firms are required to comply with the codes of ethics of state 
CPA societies, state boards of accountancy, and the AICPA. Failure to do so 
can result in loss of membership in these organizations and loss of the state 
license to practice as a CPA. The codes contain requirements, among others,
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relating to independence, integrity, and objectivity, and to compliance with 
generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles.
4. CPA firms auditing approximately 86 percent of the publicly traded compa­
nies in the United States — which represent almost 99 percent of the annual 
sales of all such companies — are members of the SEC Practice Section of 
the AICPA Division for CPA Firms. Member firms agree to —
a. Peer reviews of the quality controls of their accounting and auditing prac­
tices every three years. (Reports on these peer reviews are available to the 
public.)
b. Second partner reviews of audits of SEC clients.
c. Rotation of audit partners in charge of audits of SEC registrants every 
seven years.
d. Extensive continuing professional education for all professional person­
nel, not just those who are CPAs.
e. File annual reports with the AICPA containing key firm data. (The 
reports are open to public scrutiny.)
f. Report specified alleged audit failures to the section’s Special Investiga­
tions Committee, which determines whether corrective action is required 
by the firms involved or whether there is a need to reconsider the ade­
quacy of professional standards.
g. Comply with penalties imposed by the section’s executive committee for 
failure to comply with membership requirements.
All of the section’s activities and records are open to review by an indepen­
dent Public Oversight Board (POB) with its own staff. The POB appraises 
and issues an annual report on the section’s activities and maintains close 
liaison with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
5. CPAs and their firms practicing before the SEC are subject to private investi­
gations, injunctive actions, and disciplinary actions under SEC Rule 2(e).
6. CPAs and their firms are subject to professional liability lawsuits filed by 
private plaintiffs. CPAs may also be named as defendants in criminal 
actions.
The foregoing represents a formidable array of regulation that, taken as a whole, 
is more than adequate to cause independent auditors, in their own self-interest, to 
strive for professional excellence in their practices.
This is particularly true with regard to the exposure of independent auditors to 
lawsuits for millions of dollars of damages. No CPA or CPA firm is likely to take 
lightly the enormous cost in time and legal fees as well as damage to reputation that 
stems from being a defendant in a professional liability suit. Accountants’ liability 
insurance is small comfort because of escalating premiums and deductible 
amounts (which, for large firms, can amount to millions of dollars) borne by the 
insured.
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While CPAs are driven to perform at a high level by their professional pride, it is 
also true that exposure to legal action is a strong deterrent to substandard perfor­
mance by independent auditors. The pressures that flow from being paid by the 
audited company or from competition for clients pale in significance in the light of 
the threat of being sued for damages in amounts that could, given the size of recent 
awards and settlements, put an auditing firm out of business.
If anything, the threat of liability suits may be too strong. Contrary to the belief 
of some, improvement in the performance of independent auditors might well flow 
from carefully limiting rather than expanding their exposure to legal liability.
No scheme of regulation — by firms, by peers, or by government — will ever 
prevent all audit failures because auditing is a human art subject to individual 
human error. Neither will it guarantee that all individual auditors will be objective 
and honest any more than all crime can be eliminated by legislation and enforce­
ment. But the incidence of dishonesty or negligence on the part of CPAs has histor­
ically been extremely low in relation to other groups in society. The existence of a 
high level of integrity among auditors and the strength of the countervailing pres­
sures embodied in the present system of regulation supports the AICPA’s belief 
that major changes in the regulatory structure would not yield significant benefits.
In this connection, it should be noted that the AICPA has a long record of coop­
eration with the SEC, other regulatory bodies, and the state boards of accountancy 
to obtain their views and refine and strengthen the effectiveness of the current sys­
tem. For example, the AICPA worked extensively with the SEC to resolve differ­
ences of opinion on the approach to peer review and reached agreement on the 
nature and extent of the SEC’s access to the peer review process. Representatives 
of the AICPA Auditing Standards Board meet frequently with SEC staff to discuss 
projects on the board’s agenda and issues needing consideration. State boards of 
accountancy, in connection with their disciplinary proceedings, have required cer­
tain firms to join the Division for CPA Firms and undergo peer review. Coopera­
tion will continue.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 
STANDARDS
Any evaluation of the quality of financial reporting and the related performance of 
independent auditors requires consideration of the adequacy of financial account­
ing and reporting standards, auditing standards, and the manner in which such 
standards are established. Since the SEC has statutory authority to set generally 
accepted accounting principles (synonymous with financial accounting and report­
ing standards), that agency is expected to act whenever it believes that an inade­
quacy exists. While it has taken the initiative in some instances, the commission 
has historically followed a policy of looking to the private sector for the setting of 
standards and applying its considerable influence when that seemed necessary. 
Accordingly, financial accounting and reporting standards in the United States 
have been set primarily by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
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since 1973. Prior to that time, the AICPA performed that function through its 
Accounting Principles Board and a predecessor Accounting Procedures Commit­
tee.
Information about the structure, function, and record of the FASB is not covered 
here because that body is independent of the AICPA. However, the AICPA 
strongly supports the FASB and believes that it has a commendable record of 
achievement.
The setting of financial accounting and reporting standards will always be con­
troversial and subject to sharp criticism regardless of the body responsible and 
whether that body is in the public or the private sector. This is so for a number of 
reasons:
1. The complexity of business transactions makes the substance of such trans­
actions — which should govern the accounting — subject to differing 
interpretations.
2. Standards are man-made conventions designed to achieve reasonable uni­
formity and comparability. Judgments, often based upon estimates, are 
involved in both their development and application.
3. There are differing points of view about how standards should be structured 
and the degree of specificity that should be followed.
4. Standards have an important impact on and are of high interest to companies, 
auditors, financial analysts, investors, creditors, government regulators, 
labor unions, and others. The conflicting interests of these diverse groups 
guarantee that someone’s ox will be gored whenever a more restrictive stand­
ard is adopted.
As should be expected, the FASB has received its share of criticism, elements of 
which are often dramatically contradictory. The criticisms take the following 
form:
1. There are too many standards vs. there is not enough timely guidance.
2. Standards are too detailed vs. too many areas are left to judgments.
3. Too many alternatives exist vs. not enough alternatives exist to deal with 
special circumstances.
These criticisms reflect the tension between the perceived effectiveness of dealing 
with problems through detailed rules and the contrary need to provide guidance in 
a form that will accommodate changing and unique circumstances, some of which 
cannot be foreseen when standards are being considered.
Financial accounting and reporting standards are a framework for providing 
users with reliable financial information that is relevant and that meets reasonable 
cost-benefit tests. The problem is that what is relevant changes with circum­
stances, and judgments about costs and benefits are highly subjective. It should not 
be surprising, therefore, that the standards-setting process is the target of sharp 
criticism by those who disagree with or are adversely affected by a standard. In
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evaluating the merits of those criticisms, consideration should be given to two 
important facts:
1. Although there are exceptions, the quality of financial reporting by the vast 
majority of the more than ten thousand companies whose securities are pub­
licly traded continues to be at a high level. Users of financial statements gen­
erally do not complain that the FASB has disregarded their needs. Indeed, 
the FASB often has to emphasize to users the importance of certain informa­
tion, such as the effect of changing price levels on the financial condition of a 
company.
2. The vast majority of existing standards have been developed within the pri­
vate sector in cooperation and consultation with the SEC. Nevertheless, the 
SEC has not been reluctant to exercise its statutory mandate by the direct 
issuance of standards.
In addition, the present standards-setting structure provides several advantages:
1. The substantial costs of research and due process are borne by the private 
sector.
2. The SEC can objectively evaluate standards issued by a private sector body. 
Were it to be the initial issuer of a standard, a substantial amount of its time 
and resources would be spent in dealing with the comments of others and in 
reconciling different points of view.
3. Support for standards is likely to be better if those affected by them partici­
pate in their development. The private sector is best able to foster a participa­
tory effort.
It is for all the foregoing reasons that the AICPA believes that major changes in 
the present standards-setting process are not warranted.
AUDITING STANDARDS
Financial accounting and reporting standards provide a framework for the prepara­
tion of the financial statements that CPAs audit. Auditing standards govern the way 
in which independent auditors conduct those audits. Auditing standards are impor­
tant to regulators in evaluating the general quality of audit work and to them and 
the courts in judging the performance of CPAs in specific audits.
The AICPA has set auditing standards for over sixty-five years, although most 
of the activity has taken place since 1939 and, as business has become more com­
plex, the pace has increased in recent years. For example, between 1939 and 1972 
the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure issued fifty-four Statements on 
Auditing Procedure; between 1972 and 1984, successor bodies issued forty-nine 
Statements on Auditing Standards. In addition, seventy-three staff auditing inter­
pretations have been issued, and twenty-six accounting and audit guides relating to 
specific industries are currently outstanding.
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As a result of recommendations of a Special Committee to Study the Structure of 
the Auditing Standards Executive Committee in May 1978, the AICPA made a 
number of improvements in the auditing standards-setting process. It reduced the 
size and changed the composition of what is now known as the Auditing Standards 
Board; changed its voting requirements to require 60 percent (previously 67 per­
cent) in favor to adopt a proposed standard; opened board meetings to the public; 
provided compensation to board members who requested it to facilitate participa­
tion by individuals from smaller firms; and strengthened the staff. A 1983 AICPA 
study confirmed the continuing appropriateness of these changes.
The reconstituted Auditing Standards Board is dealing on a timely basis with 
auditing problems as they arise. It makes a major effort to obtain suggestions for 
matters that should be added to its agenda. In the seven years ended December 31, 
1984, it issued twenty-eight binding Statements on Auditing Standards that cover 
important subjects such as quality control standards, going-concern problems, 
audit sampling, audit risk and materiality, and reporting on internal accounting 
control. The Auditing Standards Board has developed a body of standards and 
interpretations that are the most comprehensive in the world. In addition, ten audit 
and accounting guides were issued during the same period. These guides are book- 
length documents that help CPAs understand the problems of an industry and the 
accounting and reporting practices appropriate to that industry, and provide guid­
ance on the application of auditing standards.
The Auditing Standards Board recognizes its responsibilities to the public. Its 
deliberations are held in meetings open to the public; it gives wide public exposure 
to proposals for new standards. It meets frequently with the staff of the SEC. And it 
conducts periodic liaison meetings with representatives of other groups, such as 
the Financial Executives Institute (a preparer group), the Robert Morris Associates 
(a user group), and the FASB, the body that sets accounting standards. The AICPA 
believes that the present structure for setting auditing standards is working well 
and is appropriate.
INDEPENDENCE
A discussion of the quality of independent audits would be incomplete without 
addressing the subject of independence, an attribute of CPAs essential to public 
reliance on audited financial statements. The concept of auditor independence 
precludes relationships that would be likely to impair the auditor’s integrity or 
objectivity.
As applied to independent auditors, integrity is an element of character that pre­
vents CPAs from intentionally committing a fault of omission or commission in 
their work. This does not mean that honest errors or mistakes will never occur.
Objectivity is the ability of CPAs to maintain an impartial attitude on all matters 
relating to the audit of financial statements. It is the quality of being able to evalu­
ate, express, and use facts without distortion by personal feelings, interests, or 
biases.
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The AICPA’s Rules of Conduct dealing with independence are based on the cri­
terion of whether reasonable persons, having knowledge of all the facts and taking 
into account normal strength of character and behavior, would conclude that a par­
ticular relationship would pose unacceptable threats to integrity or objectivity. The 
rules proscribe two general categories of relationships with audit clients:
1. Certain financial relationships with clients, such as any form of direct or 
material indirect financial interests. For example, this prohibits a CPA or any 
of his partners from owning any stock, no matter how little, in a company 
they audit or from participating in significant joint closely held investments 
with an audit client or its officers, directors, or principal stockholders.
2. Relationships in which a CPA has in effect become a part of management or 
an employee under management’s control.
A CPA having such a relationship with a client is prohibited from expressing an 
opinion on the client’s financial statements. In addition, the rules are far more 
extensive than any brief summary can indicate. For example, investments by a 
spouse or dependent person are deemed to impair independence. Also, positions 
held by close relatives can be deemed to affect independence.
The SEC, through its Financial Reporting Releases, has also promulgated 
extensive restrictions to assure the independence of auditors. The AICPA has 
worked closely with the SEC on auditor independence matters for many years.
CPA firms take great care to insure compliance with these independence rules. 
Detailed prohibitions of such things as accepting gifts or favors from audit clients 
are generally spelled out in written communications to all personnel, who are 
warned that violators will be promptly punished. Firms also go to great lengths to 
obtain assurance that their partners and professional staff are abiding by the prohi­
bitions against financial relationships with clients. The peer review process of the 
AICPA Division for CPA Firms tests compliance with the rules on auditor inde­
pendence and when violators are found — there have been some — sees that 
appropriate action is taken by the firm.
There are, no doubt, violations of the rules on independence that go undetected. 
But to the best of the AICPA’s knowledge, compliance is generally at a very high 
level.
PERFORMANCE OF MANAGEMENT ADVISORY 
SERVICES FOR AUDIT CLIENTS
Management advisory services consist of a wide range of advice and technical 
assistance to clients, including some that are audit clients, to help them improve 
the use of their capabilities and resources. Concerns that providing MAS to audit 
clients impairs auditor independence have been raised a number of times in recent 
years.
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Numerous studies have been undertaken because of these concerns. The most 
recent of these studies were by the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice 
Section in 1979 and by an independent Commission on Auditor’s Responsibilities 
in 1978. These studies found no evidence that such services had been a cause of an 
audit failure or had resulted in an impairment of independence and did not recom­
mend that prohibitions be imposed on the performance of MAS for audit clients.
Another recent study focused on the research to date, on liability lawsuits 
against auditors and on complaints filed with state boards of accountancy. It con­
cluded —
It is not apparent that a problem of any significance actually exists (K. St.
Pierre, “ Independence and Auditor’s Sanctions,” Journal o f Accounting,
Auditing, and Finance, Spring 1984).
That conclusion is further corroborated by the results of peer reviews of firms in 
the SEC Practice Section. The Public Oversight Board stated in its 1983-84 annual 
report that, based upon its tests of peer reviews, “ these procedures have not sur­
faced any evidence that suggests . . . that performance of MAS by member firms 
has diluted the objectivity required in the performance of the audit function.”
Those concerned about the effects of MAS on auditor independence often 
express the fear that audit judgments will be unduly influenced by fees earned from 
MAS engagements performed for audit clients. Such fees are, in fact, no more of a 
pressure on audit independence than the audit fee itself. Moreover, there also are 
strong countervailing forces, including the risk of loss of the right to practice and 
the exposure to liability lawsuits, that bolster independence. In addition, profes­
sional discipline and pride and the fact that a CPA firm’s economic well-being 
depends on its reputation in the community, not on fees from a single client, are 
also important factors.
Some critics urge that auditors not be permitted to provide MAS services 
because they believe such a prohibition would enhance the quality of audits. How­
ever, the AICPA, as well as those who have intimate knowledge of how audits are 
carried out, believe that the opposite is true. In MAS engagements, CPAs gain an 
in-depth knowledge and understanding of important aspects of a business enter­
prise. Like users of financial statements, auditors need to be knowledgeable about 
the client’s industry, how it will be affected by the economy, the quality of manage­
ment, the effectiveness of internal systems, and similar matters. The more know­
ledge the auditor has, the better, because auditors need to be able to judge whether 
the portrayal of a company’s transactions in the financial statements are reasonable 
in circumstances that are becoming increasingly complex.
Moreover, engaging in MAS work requires CPA firms to develop knowledge 
and skills in new technologies that are directly applied to enhance the performance 
of audits. For example, the ability to apply computer software and to deal with 
complex computer systems has become both a necessity and an effective tool in 
auditing large companies. It is doubtful that the auditing profession could develop 
and maintain such skills if it were precluded from providing MAS services.
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Some critics argue that auditors are “auditing their own work” if they perform 
MAS for audit clients and that their independence is therefore impaired. This 
notion is conceptually flawed in a number of ways.
When CPAs provide MAS they act only as outside advisors. They cannot and do 
not usurp management’s authority. Therefore, management must assume responsi­
bility for evaluating, accepting, and implementing the CPA’s advice, and AICPA 
standards require a clear understanding of this before an MAS engagement is 
undertaken. No responsible management, given its basic responsibility and inti­
mate knowledge of its business, would let outsiders make its decisions for it.
In any event, in expressing opinions on financial statements, auditors are not 
opining on the quality of such things as the client’s systems, organizational struc­
ture, or management practices, which are the types of functions on which MAS 
advice might be rendered.
The purpose of an audit is to have an outside party review management’s repre­
sentations in the financial statements. Unless auditors have, in fact, become a part 
of management, they are still outsiders with respect to financial statements even 
though they have provided MAS services to a client. The MAS services them­
selves have been rendered in the role of an outsider.
In summary, the AICPA believes that it would be a serious mistake to restrict or 
prohibit the performance of management advisory services by independent audi­
tors. There is no evidence that MAS has impaired the independence of auditors. 
Moreover, imposing restrictions would remove an important source of assistance 
to American business. The objectivity and analytical skills of CPAs and their 
knowledge of a client’s business, organization, and personnel gained through 
audits make them an ideal source of advice to management in the most cost-effec­
tive manner.
The AICPA and CPAs are highly conscious of their responsibility to guard their 
independence at all costs because impairment would destroy the CPA’s role as 
auditor. The AICPA, its SEC Practice Section, and CPA firms themselves have 
consistently adopted rules and promoted policies designed to bolster the indepen­
dence of auditors, including enforceable rules of conduct, creation of audit com­
mittees of boards of directors, attendance by auditors at shareholder’s meetings, 
management reporting on reasons for changing auditors, CPA firm reporting to 
boards of directors on MAS fees from SEC clients, and periodic rotation of part­
ners in charge of SEC audits. This is a clear record of sincere desire and dedication 
to protect the independence of auditors and indicates that the profession would be 
in the forefront of restricting management advisory services for audit clients if 
valid reasons for doing so could be demonstrated.
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CONCLUSION
The AICPA asserts that the vast majority of independent audits are of high quality. 
However, audit failures resulting from human error do occasionally occur. This 
will be so no matter how many institutional controls or technical standards are 
adopted. This is not to contend, however, that it is ever appropriate to relax and 
cease striving for better financial reporting.
Although the AICPA does not believe that major changes are called for in the 
present system of regulation of the profession, in the way accounting and auditing 
standards are established, or in the scope of services now being performed by CPA 
firms, there are areas where improvements might be made. As indicated below, 
some special studies have been begun in important areas and others have been 
under way for some time. In addition, there is an ongoing effort by the AICPA to 
monitor the effectiveness of auditing standards and to make changes when they are 
called for.
1. Discussions are being held with representatives of other organizations to 
determine whether a multiorganizational effort might be useful in identify­
ing ways to improve the prevention and detection of fraud.
2. A reexamination of the existing auditing guidance with respect to bank loan 
loss reserves is being undertaken.
3. A special AICPA committee is studying the relevance of the AICPA Code of 
Professional Ethics and the adequacy of the related enforcement machinery 
in today’s environment. The special committee is expected to issue a draft 
report in the fall of 1985.
4. A task force of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA 
Firms has been studying steps the section might take to enhance profession­
alism in the application of accounting standards. Such steps might include 
changes in the section’s membership requirements and certain changes in the 
scope of peer review.
5. In accordance with the 1984 recommendations of a special committee that 
studied the structure and operations of the SEC Practice Section, the section 
is presently considering how the public might be made more aware of the 
procedures and findings of its Special Investigations Committee.
The AICPA believes these various activities and the record of the progress that 
has been made since the last Congressional hearings in 1977 demonstrate the pro­
fession’s commitment to excellence and its recognition of the paramount impor­
tance of the public interest in the quality of independent audits.
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